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Incentives for dentists in public service : evidence from a natural experiment

By: CHALKLEY, Martin.
Contributor(s): TILLEY, Colin | YOUNG, Linda | BONETTI, Debbie | CLARKSON, Jan.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Cary : Oxford University, july 2010Subject(s): Contrato de Trabalho | Política de SaúdeJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART 20, 2, p. i207-i223Abstract: How can independent physician contractors be motivated to contribute to public service health care? We consider evidence, derived from a natural experiment in the UK publicly funded dental care system, concerning the efficacy of using a contractual mechanism that provides explicits rewards for increased service provision against the alternative of offering an employment-like relationship. We find that dentists who were moved from quasi-employment to an activity-based incentive contract increased their activity in the publicly funded service by 26%. We also find and quantify evidence of considerable variation between suppliers, which suggests that factors such as an individual's intrisic motivation, professional standards, and preferences are important moderators of financial incentives
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How can independent physician contractors be motivated to contribute to public service health care? We consider evidence, derived from a natural experiment in the UK publicly funded dental care system, concerning the efficacy of using a contractual mechanism that provides explicits rewards for increased service provision against the alternative of offering an employment-like relationship. We find that dentists who were moved from quasi-employment to an activity-based incentive contract increased their activity in the publicly funded service by 26%. We also find and quantify evidence of considerable variation between suppliers, which suggests that factors such as an individual's intrisic motivation, professional standards, and preferences are important moderators of financial incentives

Incentives and Public Service Performance: a special issue

Volume 20

Supplement 2

July 2010

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